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INTRODUCTION

China's foreign trade has played an essential role in
the

economic reform launched 12 years ago in 1978.’

The

ambitious economic reform programs require tremendous foreign
currency.

More than 80% of the foreign currency in China

comes from export.^

About $27 billion was spent on import

of the advanced foreign technology and equipment since 1978,
and nearly 60% of the net increase in China's national income
during this period was due to import and export activity.^
Because

of

the

importance

of

foreign

trade

in

China's

economy, continuous studies have been conducted by scholars
and students of business in this area in order to provide
implications

for U.S.

trade policy towards

China.

The

purpose of this paper, therefore, is to analyze the problems
in China's foreign trade system, to explore the policy issues
in reforming that system, and to make some predictions about
future prospects in China's foreign trade.
The reform in the foreign trade system has really lagged
behind the pace of reform in other areas.

The foreign trade

organizations were strongholds of economic planning, yet were
among the very last to reform themselves.

One event in

particular, the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in
June of 1989, has cast a great shadow on China's foreign
trade reforms launched in the beginning of 1988 by the now-
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ousted Party chief Zhao Ziyang.^

Why has it been so hard to

reform the foreign trade system?

What changes would reform

bring to China's foreign trade system if it had gone through?
What impact would it have on the nation 's economy? These are
the questions this paper will attempt to answer.

To intelligently discuss the current state of China's
foreign trade, we first need a brief review of its history.
Some authors have preferred to go back to the time long
before the establishment of the People's Republic.^

This,

of course, provides a broader historical background of China
as

a

nation,

but

the

reality

is that this

nation was

separated at the time of Mao's revolution and the two parts
of China adopted totally different systems.

In order to

maintain focus and vigor, this paper will concentrate on
mainland China after the Communist Party took power: the
history starting with the founding of the People's Republic
in 1949.

China's foreign trade in historical perspective is

covered by Chapter one.
Chapter two also provides background historical material,
but focuses upon a second post-revolution phase: the postCultural Revolution period of 1976 to 1990.

The Chinese

society has undergone a tremendous change since the Cultural
Revolution.

The "open door" policy has brought in ideas and

concepts that used to be absolutely forbidden, such as the
concept of free enterprise.

The meeting of western and
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eastern

cultures

and

the

mixture

of

the

socialist

and

capitalist practices have caused great confusion among the
Chinese people and their leaders.
complicated

environment

cultural, political,

of

This chapter describes the

China's

social,

and legal factors,

economic,

centering on the

economic reform which gave rise to the long-awaited reform
in the foreign trade system.
Chapters three and four cover the central topics of the
paper:

the structure of foreign trade organizations and

policy issues in foreign trade.

The structural changes in

Chinese foreign trade are extremely important —

the change

from

and

centralization

to

decentralization

specialization to diversification.

from

Without such changes,

the competition mechanism can not be brought into this giant
machine, and without competition there will never be any
vitality

injected

organizations.

into

the

many

bureaucratized

trade

Discussion of other important issues such as

the composition of commodities,

the management of foreign

investment and foreign financing, the trade between U.S. and
China,

necessarily

follows.

Based

on

these

facts

and

analysis, the future prospects of China's foreign trade are
discussed.

Following

Chapter

four

is

the

summary

and

conclusion of the foregoing four chapters' discussions from
the author's perspective.

As the nature of this paper is non-experimental, the data
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collected are secondary —

mainly from the newly published

China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Year Book —
1989. compiled by a government commission headed by the
minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade,
Tuobin.

Zheng

Statistics from other sources are also taken into

consideration in the analyses.
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Chapter 1

CHINA»S FOREIGN TRADE

IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In 1988, China's total imports and exports amounted to
$79.4 billion, according to the statistics from the Ministry
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade ( M O F E R T ) T h i s was
a dramatic 285%

increase over 1978

foreign trade.

The

average growth rate was above 16%, far surpassing the average
growth rate of the world's total trade.^

This growth rate

made China the twelfth biggest country in external trade in
the world.
Even in 1989, a year with enormous political turmoil in
Beijing,

the total import and export value still reached

$81.15 billion.

Exports were $43.128 billion —

of 6.5% from that of the previous year.
$38.127 billion —

an increase

Imports totalled

a decrease of 3.9% from that of 1988.®

Yet the history of China's

foreign trade

since the

founding of the new People's Republic in 1949, was far from
being so impressive.

The new government tried to establish

her foreign trade system immediately after it took power from
the National Party's government that fled to Taiwan.
were many obstacles ahead.

There

The major external obstacle was

the embargo of the new People's Republic of China by the
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western

countries.

At

that

time

most

of

the

western

countries didn't recognize the new China, therefore it didn't
have many trading partners even if China wanted to develop
her

foreign

ideological;

trade.

The

major

internal

obstacle

"self-sufficiency" and "self-reliance" were the

fundamental principles of the new government's policy.
this

was

guiding

policy,

the

foreign

trade

that

Under

the

new

government was willing to engage in could only be between
communist countries.
Major business in the '50s was conducted solely with
China's "big brother"—

the Soviet Union, who provided loans

and technical assistance to China in the first ten years
until relations were broken off in 1959.

Because of the

ideological and political disputes arising later between the
Russian and Chinese Communist Party, especially between the
two leaders
halted

in

Khrushchev and Mao, the Soviet loan was almost
1957

after Mao's

visit

to Moscow,

and the

relationship began to become worse at the end of the decade.
The Soviet loans to China during the First Five Year Plan
period (1950-1955) came to $1.4 billion.

After, this period,

the repayments of loans exceeded the new credits.®
The leading policy for China's foreign trade was, as the
Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) put it, "Exports are for
imports,

and

imports

are

for

the

country's

industrialization." Under this policy, equipment, machinery,
technology, and even whole plants were introduced to China
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from the Soviet Union and other eastern block countries.
This importation helped the new China

establish a primary

basis of her industry after years of wars.

In 1959, China

achieved an import and export value of $4-38 billion, and
half of this amount was with Soviet Union.

The ratio of

foreign trade to national income was about 12%.^°
The termination of the Party relations with the Soviet
Union marked the beginning of another period of China's
foreign trade.

Trade with eastern block countries dropped

precipitously.

Trade with other developing countries and a

handful

western countries was

"natural disaster" —

sparse.

The three years

caused by a setback in grain production

and bad weather, brought unbearable famine to the Chinese
people from 1960 to 1962.

The grain production fell below

150 million tons to about three quarters of the 1957 level
of production.”

The government had to further reduce export

of agricultural products and to import food to feed the
hungry.

In 1962, import and export value dropped to $2.66

billion, down about 50% from 1959's total.

The ratio of

foreign trade to national income dropped to about 8%.^^
After 1962, the economy began to reverse a little.
brought about a reversal in foreign trade.

This

In these few

years, China began to do more business with non-communist
countries, even with Japan —
diplomatic relations.

a traditional enemy without

China resumed import of machinery and

plants, though on a small scale.

And the government was
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trying to expand foreign trade to boost the economy, but had
great difficulty.

It had to heal the wounds from the recent

natural disasters as well as to repay all loans from the
Soviet Union (with final payments in 1965).

Leftist ideology and the power struggle within the Party,
compounded by long term isolation from the world, resulted
in the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

Mao launched this mass

movement in order to get rid of his major opponents in the
Party led by Liu Shaoqi —

then President of the State, and

to strengthen his own power base.

This was easily achieved,

but the movement became so massive that it went out of his
own control.

A renowned American scholar observed:

"The

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was from any point of
view one of the most bizarre events in history.

To western

observers it made China even more mysterious than usual.
Something

like

one

hundred

million

people

were

active

participants in it, many of them as victims, while at least
five hundred million can be said to have been significantly
affected by it.
The damage of the Cultural Revolution to foreign trade
was enormous.

Efforts at expanding foreign trade in the

preceding few years were disrupted, trade relations with a
number of western countries were suspended, and the very idea
of foreign trade was severely criticized and attacked by the
radical Maoists.

Imports and exports remained at about $4
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billion in the following five or six years, a decrease in
real terms from 1959.

Until 1971, the total import and

export value came to $ 4.84 billion,

only 5.8% of the

national income.

In 1971, China reentered the United Nations.

After that

year, China gradually established diplomatic relations with
Japan, European countries, Australia, New Zealand, and other
countries.
States.

It also resumed trade relations with the United

In 1979, China established full diplomatic relations

with the United States,

marking a new era for China, an era

ending thirty years of isolation, a reentrance into the world
trading family.

From then on were years exciting to many of

the world countries doing business with China.

One observer

described the trade of this period as "exploding."

Only in

1978, "according to U.S. estimates, overall trade increased
by close to 40% (in current prices), from about $15 billion
(in

1977)

to

roughly

$21

billion,

with

import

(cost,

insurance, freight) increasing by 56%, from $ 7.1 billion to
$ 11.1 billion, and exports (free on board) rising 26%, from
just under $8 billion to

$11 b i l l i o n . A c c o r d i n g

to

official Chinese statistics, this U.S. estimate was quite
close.

The import and export value

for 1978 was

billion, a 3.26% increase from that of 1971.

$20.64

This was the

beginning of a new era of economic reform.
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Chapter 2

BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN 10-YEAR REFORM

I.

Laving The Political Foundation

In order to initiate the 10-year economic reform, Deng
Xiaoping had first to clear his political path. After the
late Marshal Yie Jianying and Mao's appointed successor Hua
Guofeng managed to put Mao's widow and three other leftist
leaders in jail, Deng became vice premier.

Step by step,

Deng strengthened his power-base. The only thing he had to
do was to get rid of Hua Guofeng, who was the Chairman of
the Party.

Hua insisted on two principles after Mao's death:

"Whatever Mao says must be followed strictly; whatever policy
was laid by Mao must be carried out thoroughly.

Deng took

this as a major weapon against Hua, and his position was
reaffirmed in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress
at the end of 1 9 7 8 . In a matter of about three years, Deng
made it clear to the nation and to the world, through the
communique of the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central
Committee, that he was the number one man in the Party.
Deng's political philosophy was well embodied in one of
his famous sayings: "Whether it's white or black, as long as
it catches mice, it's a good cat."
clearly meant getting things done —

By catching mice, he
making China rich.

10
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achieve this overall goal, he called for more freedom of both
expression and creativity.

But he also made it clear at the

outset that this freedom was limited.

It had to be in line

with political unity and stability: it must not challenge his
power nor the power of his Party.

To clear the way for

change, he pensioned off more than one million senior Party
cadres.
resigned.

In

September

1985,

131

high-ranking

veterans

Generally they retained their perquisites as

members of a new Central Advisory Commission of the Party
headed by himself.^®
Deng came to power at a time when the Chinese economy
was brought to the brink of collapse by the catastrophic
Cultural Revolution.

Economic recovery was therefore of

preeminent importance both to the country and to Deng's
political position.

Deng knew very well

that a healthy

economy was essential for the consolidation of his power.
With political power in hand and political tone set, Deng
began to advocate his economic reform.

II.

General Social Conditions

After years of state manipulation of people's political
ideology,

loosening

of

such

control

and

calls

for

the

emancipation of the mind brought great changes in people's
outlooks.

With the restoration of the formal education

system so disrupted and severely damaged during the cultural
revolution, young people began to bury themselves in books
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again to regain what had been lost.
in new ways of making money.

Entrepreneurs engaged

Intellectuals were encouraged

to do research and write papers and books. There were often
lively public debates on what should be done for the economic
reform.

New cadres were recruited from those with higher

education and Party loyalty. International reactions were
positive.

People began to see more and more foreign tourists

visiting China.

Many people resumed correspondence with

their overseas relatives and family members that was cut off
during the cultural revolution.

The social conditions were

indeed quite stable and people were full of hope.

Reform

began to spread in major fields of the economy.

Ill.

Overview of Economic Reform

In the post Mao-era, the issue of economic reform had
received much publicity, but it was Deng Xiaoping’s policy
of market economy mixed with administrative control that
provided a solid foundation for economic recovery from the
cultural revolution.

His theorists termed it as an "economic

system with China's socialist characteristics."

They drew

four policy conclusions from their analysis of administrative
segmentation.
First, there should be greater separation between the
spheres of administration and economics, the latter having
more scope to operate according to its own organic logic.
This implies the formation of natural economic zones crossing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13

administrative boundaries and the promotion of inter-plant
integration, particularly through cross-boundary companies
or associations.

Secondly, central planning organs had to

be strengthened to curb branch-based departmentalism and to
establish a more rational division of labor between central
and local departments.

Central planners henceforth had to

concentrate on macro-economic management,

regulating the

micro-economy less by directive means and more by economic
levers or guidance methods.
to

be

resuscitated,

recognizing the
economy.

Thirdly, market processes were

with

a

new

ideological

commoditized character

of the

outlook
socialist

Fourth, the bedrock of the reform programme, the

decision-making autonomy of industrial enterprises, had to
be expanded.^’

Agricultural Reform
The reform experiment first started in rural areas.
policies

were

adopted

to

restructure

and

Two

readjust

the

relationship between peasants and the production units.

The

first one was the redistribution of agrarian land.

Under the

condition that the land was still collectively owned, the
land could be contracted in the form of lease to individual
peasants.

This practice gave peasants incentive to work hard

on the land and laid the overall foundation for agricultural
reform.

The

second

policy

was

to

increase

purchasing price of agricultural products.

the

state

In 1979, prices
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were

increased

by

20.1%,

and

in

1980,

another

8.1%.

Consequently, incremental income for these two years was 46
billion yuan (the unit of RMB^° —

the Chinese currency)

With these two initial policies implemented, a series of
measures were then introduced.

The people's commune was

previously a combination of local government and production
units.

This mixed creature was eliminated and the government

was separated from the production units.

This change enabled

adoption of the responsibility system of joint contracting - several peasants' households contracted for a piece of land
and had the responsibility of remitting a certain portion of
the products or profits to the state after the harvest at a
pre-fixed purchasing price.

This system applied not only

to agricultural production but also to other associated
businesses as well.
A second measure involved creation of a new purchasing
policy

for

agricultural

products.

As

the

basis

for

readjusting state purchasing prices, prices for agricultural
products were deregulated in 1985 (except for the portion
retained to supply city residents). Thus, peasants began to
have more autonomy in deciding what to do with the surplus
left after state contracts were fulfilled.

They could sell

it on the free market or sell it to the state at a negotiated
price.

This was a great change from

rigid planned economy

to planned commodity economy.
A third measure entailed readjusting the structure of
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the

agricultural

enterprise

and

the

composition

of

agricultural products, and encouraging the agrarian commodity
economy.

The state government allocated certain capital and

loans to assist peasants in establishing private businesses.
Many rural small scale factories, shops, services, schools
were established,
the

direction

leading the rural economy to develop in
of

specialization,

commodization,

and

modernization.
Reform changed the outlook of the vast countryside in
China. On the basis of 1980 prices, total agricultural output
increased from 232.7 billion yuan in 1982 to 312.76 billion
yuan in 1987 —

a growth rate of 6.2%, almost 100% greater

than the growth rate of 3.22% in the 26 years prior to 1978.
Crop output increased from 350 million metric tons in 1982
to 400 million metric tons in 1 9 8 7 From 1984 on, crop
output could basically satisfy the needs of 1 billion Chinese
people.
The birth of rural enterprises changed the relation
between the countryside and the cities;
became industrialized.

many rural areas

In 1986, the total income of rural

enterprises was 222.355 billion yuan —

32.31% of the total

rural income and 11.73% of the national income.

Ownership Reform
The reform in ownership of production means was one of
the boldest moves of this period.

The reformers claimed that
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the country was still in the primary stage of socialism, the
level of productivity was low, and that the development of
the economy was not balanced.

It was argued that, to boost

the economy, the dominant form of ownership should be changed
from

single

public

ownership.

In

ownership

the

to

meantime,

a

multi-person

management

public

should

be

distinguished and separated from ownership in publicly-owned
enterprises.

This

would

give

the

management

more

responsibility and more say in running the business. Thus
there appeared many different forms of management.
Management under contract and management under lease were
the two major forms.

Management under contract for medium

and big sized enterprises proved to be especially successful.
Contracting the right of managing the enterprise to one
person or a group of people made contractually clear the
responsibility, power, obligation and profit sharing between
management and the state government.

This was a new kind of

management mechanism for the publicly-owned enterprises.
According to statistics, more than 80% of publicly-owned
enterprises

adopted

this

responsibility system in 1987.
adopting

this

system

contracting

management

A survey of 2171 enterprises

indicated

that

productivity

was

increased by 9.4% between January and September of 1987 over
figures for the same period of the previous year.^^ For state
owned small enterprises and business,
form of experimentation.

leasing was the main

Those businesses leased out were
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primarily the ones suffering losses.

The lessee was usually

selected from a group of ambitious individuals via bidding
or public exam.

These experiments demonstrated sharply

increased economic benefits and most of the businesses turned
out to be making a profit after leasing.
Foreign investment, joint ventures, and joint management
were also new forms of ownership.

The reformers argued that

as China was still in the primary stage of socialism, the
existence

of

national

capitalism,

semi-socialism,

and

complete capitalism would introduce competition and make the
state-owned enterprises better-managed domestically and more
competitive internationally.

By the end of 1987, there were

about 9000 such enterprises —

still a very small proportion

in the economy.

Enterprise Autonomv
Strengthening the vitality of business enterprises was
a major concern of city-based reform.
enterprises

needed more

To accomplish this,

autonomy and power.

The state

government took the following measures:
1) Enlarged production planning power:
decide

their

own production

Enterprises could

and new-product

planning according to the market demand,

development

provided state

planning was conformed with.
2)

Enlarged buying and selling power:

Enterprises could

purchase raw material from the market according to their
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production needs.
3)

Surplus products could be sold at will.

Enlarged pricing freedom:

Along with more and more

loosening of price regulations, enterprises could decide the
prices for many products according to production costs and
market demand.
4)

Use

of

retained

capital:

Earnings

retained

by

the

enterprises have been growing year by year, from 3.7% in 1978
to about 30% in 1982, and 40% in 1987.
power

of deciding how and where

Concomitantly, the

to use these

retained

earnings also increased greatly.
5) Distribution of wages and benefits:

Only the government

could decide the aggregate amount of salaries and their
growth rate.

Enterprises would decide how to distribute

increases among employees.

Usually, salaries and bonuses

were related to profit realized.
6) Parallel economic ventures :
whether

they

would

like

to

Enterprises could decide

have

parallel

ventures

in

different areas, different professions, different ownership,
etc.
7) Personnel power: Enterprises could decide upon their own
criteria for recruiting and also upon promotion and demotion
of medium and/or lower lever managerial personnel.
Another

important reform

in this

area was

in labor

salary.

It was the first attempt to break the "iron rice

bowl" —

the state guaranteed job, since the founding of the

People's Republic of China.

Many experiments were conducted
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to

find

out the most

effective way

of giving monetary

incentive to employees in order to increase productivity.
Efforts

were made

in associating

bonuses

with

relevant

economic responsibility.

Macro Economic Management,
The objective of the economic reform was to establish an
economic system combining the advantages of a planned economy
with

the

vitality

of

a

market

economy.

Around

this

objective, the following measures were taken at the macro
economic management level:
1) Planning System:

The government reduced the scope of

compulsory planning and decentralized the power of planning
management in order to have more market force adjusting
demand and supply.

Approval of investment projects was also

decentralized to a lower level of government.

Projects of

a non-manufacturing nature could be approved at provincial
level.

Complete return of investment was contracted to the

relevant units for the sake of safety.
2)

Financing

system:

The

single

state

payment

and

reimbursement system was reformed to contract the budgeted
amount to each level of government so that each had to manage
financing carefully.
business.

Financing was no longer solely a state

New forms of financing were also experimented

with, such as public stock, joint management, credit loans,
etc.

Taxes took the place of turning in profits to the
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state, and new forms of taxes were created to function as an
economic lever.
3) Monetary System; A new monetary system was established,
with the central bank as the main body and many other
monetary institutions

supporting and cooperating, including

investment and trust firms.
resumed.

The insurance business was

In a few big cities there even appeared several

primary securities markets.

Circulation And Price Svstem
Great efforts were made to develop a market system for
a commodity economy.

In order to achieve this, the old

system of one channel purchasing, wholesaling, and retailing
was changed.

Primary and secondary wholesale shops directly

administered by the Commerce Ministry were restructured to
be administered by the commerce departments of the major
cities, enlarging the autonomy of these state-owned commerce
units.

They had incentive to develop multi-channel buying

and selling networks,

the result many big trade center,

shopping malls, and wholesaling markets. Also, private-owned
business boomed like mushrooms after rain.

These changes

made consumers' lives much easier.
The major issue in price reform was the so called "twotier" price system.

This system was characterized by its

supplementary regulatory role.^^

Instituted in 1984, the

two-tier pricing system was designed

so that
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production material such as crude oil, coal and steel, there
was no longer a unified state-fixed price.
be made into three categories —
and market price.

The price was to

fixed price, floating price,

The fixed price was used for the quantity

of the output within the state plan.

The floating and market

prices were used for surplus quantities.

This policy was

only applied to important industrial products.

For consumer

products and some of the agricultural products, the prices
were gradually deregulated.

Reform In Cities
After initial success in the rural area, there were also
experimental reforms in the cities.

The major underlying

idea was enabling cities to get rid of bureaucratic bondage
and allowing for a functional atmosphere for organizing and
managing.

The major measures taken were the following:

1) The administrative power of all the functional areas were
decentralized, the autonomy of all enterprises and businesses
was enlarged.
2) In big and economically important cities, conglomerates
no

longer

needed

governments.

to

affiliate

with

their

provincial

They could make their own economic plans and

budget directly with the state council, enjoying more freedom
in

implementing

their

economic

strategies

within

the

guidelines of government regulations.
3) Reform also touched municipal governments:

they had to
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simplify the governmental hierarchy and make each department
more professional and efficient.

Their economic activities

were also supposed to be supervised by the residents of the
cities.

IV.

Legal Conditions

In order to manage the economy by means of law and to
meet the requirements of the opening reform policy, the Sixth
Convention

of

the

National

People's

Congress^^

and

its

standing committee continued to give creation of economic law
priority.

In the past few years, most of the laws passed or

submitted for examination by the People's Congress concerned
the economy or the policy of opening to the outside world.
As early as 1981, The Law of Economic Contracts was drawn
up.

In April 1986, the General Civil Law was passed, a basic

law

adjusting

the

relations

of

the

commodity

economy.

Injecting vitality into business enterprises has been a key
link in the economic reform.

The separation of ownership and

management was therefore required by the reform, so as to
give more power and initiative to the management of stateowned enterprises.

The General Civil Law stipulated the

regulations governing the enterprise legal person and gave
the sole power of management to the enterprise.

It also

stipulated rules for joint-management between legal persons,
promoting crosswise economic alliances between enterprises.
Thm state-owned Industrial Enterprise Law (draft) defined the
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separation

of

ownership

and

management,

responsibilities of the factory director.
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law

including

the

In December 1985,

(tentative)

was passed to

promote independent management of the state-owned enterprises
and to let them assume sole responsibility
and losses.

for their profits

Meanwhile, the Statistics Law and the Accounting

Law were also written to ensure central control and state
supervision of all socioeconomic activities.^^

Laws were also made regarding the use and management of
natural resources.

Such laws like the Forestry Law, the

Prairie Law, the Fishing Law, the Mineral Resource Law, the
Land Management Law, the Water Law, and so on, were all basic
laws addressing the use and management of various natural
resources.
In order to ensure the proper implementation of the opendoor

policy,

Laws

were

also

formulated

activities involving foreign nationals.

to

govern

all

Such laws include

the Law for Economic Contracts with Foreign Nationals, the
Law for Foreign Investment Enterprises, and the Law for Joint
Venture Enterprises.

In the process of economic reform and opening to the
outside

world,

new

problems

regulation frequently arose.

requiring

immediate

legal

Because China was inexperienced

in legislative reform and there were circumstances where the
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conditions calling for legislation were as yet immature, the
People's

Congress

temporary

rules

authorized

and

the

regulations

State
for

Council

issues

to make

involved

in

economic reform and opening to the outside world, as long as
such rules and regulations did not contradict the basic
principles

laid

down by. the

People's

Congress

Standing Committee.
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Chapter 3

THE STRUCTURE OF CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE ORGANIZATIONS

I. The Organization
China's foreign trade organizations were established in
imitation of the Soviet model after the founding of the
Peoples' Republic.
the

sole

The Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) had

responsibility

of

planning,

supervising,

and

implementing all the foreign trade businesses and activities.
Because of the ideological concern over "self-sufficiency and
self-reliance" and the fear of undue foreign influences, the
Ministry of Foreign Trade was one of the most strictly
controlled ministries, probably second only to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
One of the most distinctive features of this organization
is its dual structure of internal administrative control and
external

business management.

It has three area policy

bureaus in charge of Europe, Africa, and America and the
Atlantic, as well as a dozen functional bureaus within itself
in charge of functional divisions such import and export,
international

cooperation,

foreign

loan

and

foreign

investment, quota and licenses, regulation and law, planning
and financing, etc. Its overseas's organs are the commercial
offices of the Chinese embassies

in each country.

25
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internal agencies outside the ministry itself are the foreign
trade bureaus in each province, autonomous region, and the
cities directly administered by the State Council.
agencies

represent each level

of government.

These

From the

administrative and personnel standpoints, they are part of
the

provincial

government.

The

MOFT

didn't

administrative and personnel power over its bureaus.

have
All

the directors of the foreign trade bureaus were assigned by
the organizational department of the provincial Communist
Party Committee.

However, the MOFT did have the power to

assign the overseas's personnel though.

There used to be a

Ministry of Foreign Liaison that was in charge of economic
cooperation with, and aid to, other communist and developing
countries.

For

the

purpose

of

simplifying

bureaucratic government organizations,

the

bulky

this ministry was

merged with MOFT in 1982 and the new ministry became the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT).
Another important subordinate to MOFERT is The China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT).
This is a semi-ministerial level organization representing
non-governmental business affairs. The director of CCPIT is
often an ex-vice minister of MOFERT.
directly involved in trade.
cannot do —

The CCPIT does not get

Its main function is what MOFERT

establish business relations with countries with

which China has no formal diplomatic relations.

Its other

functions include organizing international trade exhibitions,
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arbitration,

foreign business

related

legal publication,

trademark registration, and so on.
We

find

corporations

similarities
(FTCs)

to

in

that

of

China's
MOFERT.

foreign
The

trade

FTCs

are

supposedly non-governmental business entities but they are
directly administered by the MOFERT.

All the presidents and

general managers are assigned by the personnel bureau of
MOFERT.
their
silks,

These dozen FTCs have exclusive trading rights over
specialized products
foodstuffs,

light

such

as textiles,

industry,

and so on.

chemistry,
Foreign

trading rights are approved and assigned only by MOFERT.
These FTCs have their "branches" in each province, autonomous
region, and municipality directly administered by the state
council.

These branches are the basic trading units in

China, actually conducting most of the import and export
business with foreign customers.
FTCs as "head offices."
distinction

between

The Chinese refer to the

This exposes another important

FTCs

and

western

corporations.

Corporation would refer to the organization as a whole, while
"head office" here only refers to the group of people in
Beijing under the MOFERT.

Prior to 1978, the head offices

had more power in business over the branches even though the
head offices didn't have personnel power.

Most of the

contracts were only signed by the head office people for
control purposes.

After the business was concluded, a copy

of the contract was then sent to the relevant branches for
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execution.

After 1978,

the "branches" of the FTCs were

becoming increasingly independent of the head offices and
more

affiliated

to

the

foreign

trade

bureaus

who had

administrative and personnel power over these branches, than
to the head offices who only supervise their businesses. They
actually

became

more

like

accounting units than
names.

"companies"

with

independent

"branches" as suggested by their

Under this authoritarian system, administrative and

personnel

power

often

supervision of business.

carried

more

weight

than

the

We can see clearly the management

dilemma the head offices and the branches have with these
conflicting and vague affiliations and control structures.

Besides these specialized foreign trade corporations
directly administered by MOFERT (See Appendix D for the major
FTCs under MOFERT) , there were growing number of corporations
administered by other industrial ministries that also had
foreign

trading

rights

authorized

by

MOFERT.

These

corporations tended to be very specialized in their relevant
industries such as shipbuilding, aero-technology, automotive,
postal and telecommunications appliances, and so forth (See
Appendix E for selected FTCs administered by ministries other
than MOFERT). Provincial governments were also establishing
their general-purpose trading corporations to grab a share
from the FTCs, especially in import.

Businesses done by

these corporations used to have only about 10% of the total
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import and export value.

Due to the reform and open-door

policy, these corporations were increasing their share of the
business tremendously.

The 1988 World Bank Country Report

estimated that business done by corporations other than FTCs
increased from 11% to 28% in the four years from 1981 to
1984.^®
The head offices under MOFERT had a lot of power with
respect to some major industrial and agricultural products.
MOFERT

gave

the

exclusive

trading

rights

of

these

economically weighty products such as crude oil, wheat, rice,
food stuffs, cotton, wood products, and so on to the head
offices, who in turn established specialized departments to
deal with these products.
purchasing products

to

They could assign the task of

the

selling rights to themselves.
in volume

and

easy

to

branches,

while

keeping

the

These products are usually big

control

process-wise,

making

it

possible for the head offices to handle these transactions
all by themselves.

For smaller volume products like light

industrial products, arts and crafts, garments, animal by
products, etc., the head offices had to rely on the branches
to handle all transactions.
were

The head offices' major tasks

thus planning and budgeting the

business for the branches.
trading

delegations

statistical

to

import and export

They also organized trade fairs,
visit

record-keeping,

their

data

foreign

preparation

customers,
for

the

ministry's negotiations with foreign governments on trade
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agreements,

and the set up of overseas representative's

offices and joint ventures.

II.

The Operation

Planning is the first stage of operation.

During the

latter half of each year, the State Planning Commission (SPC)
assembles representatives of MOFERT, the Ministry of Finance,
the People's Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the FTCs'
head offices to formulate an initial plan for the year's
exports.

Prior to this, SPC will collect each ministry's

import plans.

The export plan is formulated with an starting

objective of determining how much export is needed in order
to realize the necessary imports,

then, how much of the

import plan cannot be covered by the export plan and must be
financed

elsewhere.

The

import

plan

is

primarily

an

aggregate of plans submitted by the different ministries.
Unless a constituent plan is either unrealistic or does not
conform with the import policies (e.g., calls for the import
of consumer goods instead of other more needed industrial
goods),

MOFERT

usually cannot change

its composition

without consent from the relevant ministry.
Formulation of the export plan is MOFERT's major task.
A plan's structure is based upon two conditions:

one is

available historical data, the other is the capability of
providing more suitable goods and more export capacity for
existing products from each FTC.

Of course, the head offices
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would have already gathered these data and information from
the branches by the time of the yearly meeting.

After 1978,

there was no real ideological barrier preventing export.
Anything

that

could

exported.

The

finished

products

be

exported

was

encouraged

only guiding policy was
than

semifinished

to

be

to export more

products

and

raw

materials.
The planning process is initially a bargaining process.
MOFERT always wants to impose more export upon the head
offices.

The head offices always lay out different kinds of

exportation or production difficulties
reduce the planned amount.

in an attempt to

Nobody wants a big plan that

could hardly be fulfilled, it would sound bad in the yearend report and could jeopardize some benefits and bonuses.
Once the head offices reach an agreement on the amount of
export,

there would come the second round of bargaining

between the head offices and the branches.

The aggregate

plan becomes mandatory once the head offices accept MOFERT*s
plan.

The only room for adjustment would be among different

branches, the results depending on bargaining power of the
branches.

Even after the plan becomes mandatory, in the face

of extreme hardship or unforeseeable market changes, the head
offices can always appeal to MOFERT for changes in the plan
such that the benefits and bonuses budgeted for the branches
would remain unaffected.
The

implementation of the plan

rests mainly
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branches, as the branches deal with most of the products.
The head offices have some administrative control over the
operations of the branches in areas such as issuing import
and/or export licenses, allocation of quotas, allocation of
the

foreign

exchange

budget,

trade

group

organization of trade fairs, and so forth.
the head

offices were

signing

all

the

organization,
Prior to 1978,

contracts.

The

branches didn't have the authority to sign contracts, even
though they were the ones to execute the contracts.

Along

with the furthering of reform, the branches have acquired
more and more authority.

If the products are not required

by MOFERT to be dealt with by the head office, some of the
branches don't even deal with the head offices any more,
unless the products need quota or other licenses controlled
by the head offices.
There are two important fairs held biannually in Canton
for export commodities.

These two fairs are the biggest

events in China's foreign trade each year and provide the
best means for the head offices

to control the branches.

The head offices used to allow the branches to accept orders
only during these fairs.

All the contracts would be signed

by the head offices and copies of these contracts were
retained by them.
fulfilled.

After the

fair contracts would be

If business was concluded outside the fair, it

had to be accomplished during

the

trade

abroad, as organized by the head offices.

groups'

visits

Whenever foreign
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customers

visited

China

on

business,

discussions

were

supposed to be held exclusively in the head offices in
Beijing.

If customers insisted on going to the branches,

then usually the head offices would send someone to accompany
the customers to visit the branches.

These practices proved

impossible to continue during the years of reform.

Ill.

The Reform

With the deepening of reform in China's overall economic
structure,

the

organizations
demands.

old

was

structure

no

longer

of

the

sufficient

foreign
to meet

trade
growing

Enterprises having business with the monopolized

FTCs began to feel more and more dissatisfied with the bad
service they received.
bureaucracy,

the

The major problems were the sluggish

insensitivity,

the

inefficiency,

the

corruption and excessive costs that the FTCs accrued in
dealing with manufacturers,
industrial ministries

buyers,

complained

Industry,
to

the

Many

openly challenged the monopolistic

power of FTCs under MOFERT.
Textiles

and suppliers.

led
then

by

In 1985,
the

the Ministry of

Minister

Premier

Zhao

Wu

Ziyang

Winying,
about

the

inefficiency of MOFERT and its FTCs, and demanded drastic
reform, including handing over foreign trading rights to the
industrial

ministries

such

as

the

Ministry

of

Textile

Industry, in order to overcome the "airlock" between the FTCs
and the industrial suppliers and u s e r s . T h e report by the
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Minister actually accused MOFERT of being responsible for
creating

barriers

between

the

domestic

suppliers

and

international buyers and thus preventing textile exports from
growing as fast as they could.
It was not a new problem.

Prior to that, MOFERT had

conducted some studies about the existing problems within
its organizational settings.

They made some efforts in

decentralizing control to lower level units to achieve better
and more efficient management.
because

of

competition

MOFERT was forced to do this

from

the

newly

established

institutions that were authorized by the State Council to
have similar power in international dealings.

One such

institution was the China International Trust and Investment
Corporation (CITIC) , a ministerial institution headed by Rong
Yiren,

Vice

Leader

of

the

People's

Congress.

This

institution was primarily designed to attract foreign capital
investment in China, Observers could smell that if the boss
of CITIC was more powerful than the minister of MOFERT, then
his corporation would be more influential in business than
the FTCs under MOFERT.
MOFERT submitted a report to the State Commission on
Reform of the Foreign Trade System in 1984-

In the report

MOFERT proposed to reform the foreign trade organizations
along the following five dimensions.
1)

Separate

government

functions

from

enterprise

management and strengthen the administrative management of
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foreign trade.

This proposal aimed at MOFERT's leaving

all day-to-day functions related to trade to the FTCs so that
MOFERT

could

regulations,

concentrate

such

areas

as

drafting

formulating long term plans, advising on the

appropriateness
conducting

on

of

economic

negotiations

with

levers

related

foreign

to

trade,

governments,

and

conducting research and training.
2) Simplify administration and transfer power to lower
administrative levels, bringing into full play the managing
initiative of the various foreign trade enterprises.
This

proposal

enterprises

was

meant

to

free

the

foreign

trade

from their administrative departments,

while

keeping their own accounts, assuming responsibility for their
own profits and losses, and developing in the direction of
specialization and socialization.
3) Adopt an import and export agency system to improve
the operations and management of foreign trade.
This proposal meant that the foreign trade enterprises
should provide the diversified services that a normal foreign
trade agent would provide, besides their designated product
line.

This

practice

would

introduce

the

competition

mechanism into the foreign trade organizations.

When these

enterprises failed to provide good services, the manufacturer
and the user could go to other "agents" for better service.
4) Reform the foreign trade planning system and simplify
the contents of the yearly export/import plan.
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5)

Reform

the

foreign

trade

financial

system

and

strengthen the economic means of regulation.
The last two proposals were designed to give the foreign
trade enterprises more power in their planning and decision
making, giving them more responsibility for their own profits
and losses.
The

general

direction

of

these

decentralization and diversification.

proposals

was

MOFERT described the

spirit of their proposals by a four character expression —
an English equivalent of which could be:
Administration

and

Decentralizing

the

"Simplifying the
Power."

Yet

implementing these proposals proved harder than formulating
them.
Structurally,

head

administration of MOFERT.

offices

are

under

direct

They are in many ways the arms of

MOFERT and are much closer to MOFERT than the foreign trade
bureaus of the provincial governments.

These foreign trade

bureaus are supposed to be the local agencies of MOFERT, but
for personnel

and

administrative

reasons

they

are more

associated with the local governments than with MOFERT.

The

head offices had a lot of the administrative functions of
MOFERT in the period of 1978 to 1986.

A good example would

be the allocation of textile quotas with the then EEC. MOFERT
would allocate the quota to each specialized head office,
then the head offices would allocate them to their provincial
branches.

Quota allocation is obviously an administrative
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function.

Many branches that didn't have enough quota for

export would be unhappy with the head offices and would come
to complain to the foreign trade bureaus that they couldn't
fulfil their export plan because they didn't have enough
quota,

and that the head offices had given preferential

treatment

to

certain

other

branches.

This

kind

controversy was quite common under that structure.
was in great dilemma about what to do;

of

MOFERT

they were really

reluctant to cut the power in their head offices and thereby
decentralize their own power amongst the local foreign trade
bureaus.
Despite the difficulties,
MOFERT to change,
big

cities

and

growing competition

forced

CITIC was establishing its branches in
provinces.

Foreign

trade

bureaus

were

establishing their own foreign trade companies under their
control.

MOFERT tried to implement some of the proposals,

achieving the following:
1)

The previous

"branches"

of the

FTCs became more

independent of the head offices, especially those dealing
with products not MOFERT-prescribed to the head offices.
This change gave the provincial companies more decision
making power and made them look more like companies than
"branches".
2) Experiments introducing the "agency" system made the
head offices and branches pay much more attention to the
adequacies of their services.

Previously, the manufacturers
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had no choice but to go through the designated company to
export their products.

Now if they were unhappy with the

service they received,

they could go to a company of a

different province for business.

This system also allowed

FTCs with particular specializations to deal with other
products. Although these experiments were limited to only a
few

FTCs,

the

significance

of bringing

the

competition

mechanism into these FTCs who had previously taken their
privileges for granted was far reaching.

With this new

flexibility, companies could easily diversify into different
lines of business as long as they operated efficiently.
3)

A

great

change

was

taking

place

in

management

objectives. Previously, foreign trade enterprises were only
concerned with fulfilling the import and export plan, because
any loss was born by the state in the form of a subsidy.

Now

they had to be concerned not only with fulfilling the plan,
but also in breaking even or making a profit.

The planning

process was also simplified. Not all the plans are mandatory.
The part of the plan that is mandatory is now called the
"command plan",

while the part of the plan that is not

mandatory became known as the "guidance plan." This left the
foreign trade enterprises much more room and responsibility
to formulate their own business goals and strategies.

However, with all the efforts taken by MOFERT to reform
its organizations, the most basic change didn't take place
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until

the beginning of

structural

change

—

1988.
change

Essential
that

would

change

lay in

redefine

the

relationship between the head offices and the branches, as
well as the relationship between the head offices and MOFERT
itself.

This structure was created more than 30 years ago

in imitation of the Soviet model, to fit the old ideological
necessity and the centrally planned economy.

Under the new

economic and political conditions, any reform measures taken
in China's foreign trade would be superficial without a
restructuring of the whole system.
easy matter:

But restructuring was no

restructuring a giant,

complex 40-year-old

organization took great courage and tremendous efforts.
In the beginning of 1988, then-premier Zhao Ziyang was
quite decisive in his actions to restructure the foreign
trade organizations, despite very strong opposition.

His

policies centered around the overall pursuit of contracting
a management-of-responsibility system.

This policy was aimed

at changing the old foreign trade system which dispersed
responsibility,

authority,

and profits into a new system

which unified these three, and therefore made the new system
an entity responsible for its own profit and losses, instead
of

the

state.

The major policies

undertaken were the

following:
1)

The

provinces,

administered municipalities,

autonomous

regions,

state-council

and the FTCs which undertake

execution of the export plan were to contract directly from
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the state the export plan for foreign exchange and turn in
the

foreign

exchange

to

the

fulfillment of the plans.

central

government

after

If the basic target of the

contract was attained, then a percentage of foreign exchange
could be retained by the contracting units.

If there was any

excess foreign exchange realized beyond the basic target,
most or all of the excess foreign exchange could be retained
by the contracting units.
2) All the foreign exchange earning enterprises enjoyed
tax breaks, including relief from the product tax incurred
in the production process, the commercial tax incurred in
the circulation process, and the value-added tax.
3) The local governments, and other contracting units
that retained foreign exchange could use it without prior
approval if the usage was in accordance with relevant state
regulations.
4) With the exception of the head offices and their
relevant branches that are regulated to exclusively deal with
certain products,

all other branches of FTCs were to be

decentralized to the local governments and managed by the
unified state policy.

The local government was to divide the

export plan contracted by each foreign trade company and the
relevant manufacturer and to push forward the export agency
system.
5)

The specialization system was to be

Except for a few important,

liberalized.

resource-oriented commodities
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dealt with exclusively by one or a few FTCs in import and
export, most of the commodities and products were to be freed
from regulated specializations and dealt with by any foreign
trade companies having the foreign trade rights.
6)

After the reform; the head offices were to develop

themselves

in the direction

of multi-functional,

multi

national conglomerates, to develop the international markets,
and to provide better service for the foreign trade.
These new policies shocked the head offices.

They had

been too powerful for so many years and had gotten used to
their power.

The very idea that the branches would not

listen to them any more made them nervous; and the very idea
that the manufacturers and users would decide whether they
need the services of the head offices made them unable to
accept the reality.
avail.

Many head offices protested, but to no

They had to reexamine what to do when power was

decentralized to the branches.

The major strategy was to

establish more subsidiaries and joint ventures overseas.
Overseas operations were regulated to get
from MOFERT.

prior approval

It was much easier for .the head offices to get

the approval from MOFERT than for the branches.

The FTCs did

develop a better network of overseas representative offices.
Another possibility was to transform the head offices into
business

associations,

exporters association.

such

as

a textile

importers

and

This would still enable them to

retain a certain power as a industry group.
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The branches seemed to gain their own footing.

Many of

them were trying to formulate new, competitive strategies.
Some branches were thinking of having joint ventures with
the head offices so that they could use the overseas network
of the head offices to their advantage.
was

a

extremely

dynamic

period

for

In any case, this
the

foreign trade

organizations.

Outside the MOFERT system,
taken to grant
oriented

an important measure was

foreign trading rights to major export-

manufacturing

enterprises.

This was

aimed at

eliminating the "airlock" between foreign buyers and domestic
producers.
personnel

These enterprises were authorized to recruit
for international business.

Many people were

recruited from foreign trade companies and foreign trade
schools in starting their own direct foreign business.
results of this experiment were mixed.

The

Some enterprises

achieved more efficiency in producing and selling, especially
in meeting customers' needs.
well but selling poorly,
specific

knowledge

communications.

in

Some others handled production

as international sales required
business

Comparatively

transactions

speaking,

foreign

and
trade

companies had a broader customer base and more knowledge in
daily transactions and customs regulations.
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Chapter 4

POLICY ISSUES IN CHINA’S FOREIGN TRADE

I.

Composition of Trade

China has a vast territory,

rich in resources.

Yet

China's huge population reduces the actual resource per
capita to a value much smaller than the world average.
Therefore,

exporting

raw materials

and primary products

cannot be a policy in China's foreign trade.
door policy,

Under the open-

China has intentionally tried to change the

composition of the import and export commodities.
In the

'50s, agricultural products and other primary

products accounted for as much as 79.4% of the total export,
industrial products only 20.6%. Until 1966, primary products
were still more than 60% of the total export.

In the '70s,

industrial products exportation slightly increased, such that
by 1978, they accounted for 46.5% of the total e x p o r t , F r o m
then on, China's economy came into a period of steady and
fast growth.
changes

in

Industrial structure changed greatly, bringing
the

composition,

of

export

commodities

and

providing the necessary conditions for further processing and
finishing of the products.

In this time, besides continuing

to export the traditional products, China increased its pace
of export

for equipment,

machine tools,

ships,

43
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appliances,

and so forth.

joined

the

in

export

Domestic-made airplanes also

commodities

and

international market for the first time.

came

onto

the

In 1988, primary

products exported were $14,453 billion, only 35.6% of the
total export, while exports of finished industrial products
were $ 26.186 billion, 64.4% of the total e x p o r t . T h i s
change

improved

China's

economic

conditions

and was

in

accordance with the direction of the world trade.
There are still serious problems in the composition of
China's

exports. - Taking

1987

for

example,

industrial

products exported were $21,259 billion, 61.2% of the year's
total export.

Among them,

light industrial and textile

products were $14 billion, 40.3% of the total export.

Under

the

these

prevailing

conditions,

to

export

as

much

products for foreign exchange was good policy.
products are still low-value products.

as

Yet these

When there is demand

in the domestic market and competition is very strong in
international

market,

excessively

reliance

upon

these

products for increasing export is not in the best interest
of the

country's

economy.

After

careful

study of the

products being traded in the world market, MOFERT decided
that

machinery

and

promising for export.

electronic

products

were

the

most

These products constituted about 20%

of the world trade in the '50s, about 25% in the '60s, and
about 33% presently, and will increase more in the future.
More than fifty percent of some developed countries' export
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is represented by machinery and electronic products.

China

has tried hard to increase production and export of these
goods.

From 1986 to 1988, the increase of these products in

export was more than 50%.

The total export of these products

in 1988 came to $6.2 billion, 13% of the total e x p o r t . T h i s
is still a small percentage.

Priority is given to the

expansion of these industries.

II.

Foreign Debt and Investment

China's foreign debt increased very rapidly after 1979,
with

recent years seeing accelerated increases.

From 1985

to 1988, the foreign debts were respectively $15.8 billion,
$21.5 billion, $30.2 billion, and $40 billion, for an average
growth rate of 36%.

The composition of this debt was also

changing in a desirable direction.

Short term debt decreased

from 41% in 1985 to 18% in 1 9 8 8 U.S. dollars, Japanese
Yen, Hong Kong dollars. West German Marks, French Francs, and
Special Drawing Rights constitute the major currencies of the
debt.

Among them, U.S. Dollars and Japanese Yen represent

the biggest share.

The foreign debts were mainly invested

in basic industries such as agriculture,
energy, and the chemical industry.
given

to

industries

such

transportation,

Consideration was also

as machinery,

light

industry,

textile industry, electronics, education, health, and so on.

The general principle of the debt management is termed
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as "unified leadership and specialized responsibilities."
That is, the State Council takes charge of making foreign
borrowing policies and separate government agencies take care
of

borrowing

plans

plus

different resources.

the

management

of

debts

from

The Ministry of Finance is in charge

of borrowing from the World Bank.
foreign governmental loans.

MOFERT is in charge

The People's Bank of China is

in charge of loans from IMF and the Asian Development Bank.
The Ministry of Agriculture, Husbandry, and Fisheries is in
charge

of

loans from

the Organization

of

International

Agricultural Development Funds. Finally, the Bank of China
is in charge of energy loans from Japan's Import Bank as well
as

with

issuing

bonds

internationally.

In

order

to

facilitate commercial borrowing, the State Council approved
10 "windows" through which foreign commercial loans could be
made.

These windows are the Bank of China, the Bank of

Transportation, the Bank of Investment, and the CITIC and
its branches in Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Guangdong, Fujian,
and Hainan provinces.
There are three ways of borrowing and repaying the debt
in China.
repaying.

The first

is unified borrowing

and unified

This refers to the kind of borrowing done by

governmental agencies, where the interest and the principles
are in turn repaid by these government agencies.
of

debt

includes

the

loans

from

international

This kind
monetary

organizations and foreign governments, and is used mainly in
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basic industries and within the country's infrastructure.
The second type of credit transaction is unified borrowing
and self-repaying.

This kind of borrowing usually comes from

the local governments and enterprises.

It is approved by the

central government and then borrowing is carried out by the
central government but repaid by the local governments and
enterprises.

This kind of borrowing has increased greatly

in recent years.

The third type of transaction is self

borrowing and self-repaying.
enacted

by

the

borrowers

This kind of borrowing is

themselves

through

authorized

windows and repaid by the borrowing entities.
In order to supervise and monitor external borrowing,
the State Council

approved the Tentative Regulation For

Monitoring External Debt.

This regulation rules that all

the borrowers within the territory of China must report
borrowing to the
Control

and

General Administration of Foreign Exchange

register

the

loans,

reporting

occurring after the initial registration.

any

changes

These measures

were aimed at completely controlling the external borrowing,
which was a major recommendation from the World Bank.

In the

latter's country report of 1988, it specifically called for
"setting limits on the aggregate amount of external borrowing
consistent with the medium-term BOP

(balance of payment)

outlook" and "approval and control procedures are required"
to ensure that "limits are adhered to and composition is
met.

The Chinese government seemed to be taking this
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advice seriously.

But how to balance the control of the

debts by the government and the adjustment of the debts by
the market mechanism which has been introduced into the
Chinese economy through the reform programs?
bigger

challenge

to

the

Chinese

government

This is a
than

simply

controlling the debts themselves.

Foreign investment is the highlight of the "open door"
policy.

The import of foreign technology and equipment has

always been given priority,

but in many instances those

imports fail to produce the results and efficiency expected
by

the

various

Chinese

industrial

users.

The

Chinese

government gradually realized that foreign managerial know
how should accompany the import of foreign technology and
equipment and the need for more capital investment plus the
need for direct foreign participation in management became
a major consideration in the government's determination to
attract more foreign direct investment.

To achieve this, a

series of laws and regulations have been promulgated.
include;

law

registration

on
of

joint
joint

venture,
ventures,

management in joint ventures,

regulations
regulations

on
on

They
the
labor

an income-tax law on joint

ventures, the law of economic contracts, regulations on the
exploitation of offshore petroleum resources in cooperation
with foreign enterprises, the laws of Special Economic Zones,
etc.
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There are six kinds of arrangements that comprise foreign
investment in China.

They are the wholly foreign-owned

ventures, equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures,
joint development, compensation trade, and processing and
assembling.

Contractual joint venture is very similar to

equity joint venture,

only it is more flexible than the

latter in the form of partnership; it can do whatever the
contracting parties agree to.

Joint development is mainly

used for foreign-Chinese cooperation in exploiting natural
resources —

most commonly for offshore oil.

Compensation

trade is different from other forms in that the purchase of
machinery from abroad, by a local enterprise, is financed in
whole or in part by goods produced after the purchase.

In

processing and assembling, the foreign parties provide some
or all the inputs to a product, then the Chinese enterprise
uses the inputs to make the product which is then returned
to the foreign party for a fee.^^
The results have been amazing.

From 1979 to 1988, the

number of foreign direct investment (FDI) enterprises was
10,052, government approved agreements numbered 15,997, and
the capital actually invested amounted to $11,517 billion.
The

Chinese

government made FDI

easiest

in the Special

Economic Zones (SEZ), with flexible regulations and various
tax breaks.
"by

the

In Shenzhen, the best known SEZ, for example,

end

industrial

of

1986

contracts

some

760

foreign

in Shenzhen,

and

enterprises
there were
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additional agreements for export processing.... already §600
million had been invested in industry.

The year 1988

turned out to be a record year for FDI in China.

The number

of government- approved FDI agreements was 5,903, and actual
invested foreign capital totalled §2.6 billion.
In 1986, an American company made a survey of 70 joint
venture

enterprises

in

China.

60%

of

those

surveyed

expressed satisfaction with FDI results, 25% were unable to
reply because the businesses had just been opened, and 15%
replied as having real difficulties.
resurveyed the same enterprises again.

In 1988 this company
This time, 91% of

those surveyed were satisfied, while only 9% were having
difficulties.

This probably is a very favorable survey to

the Chinese government as it is quoted by Liu Yimin, the
director of the Bureau of the Administration of Foreign
Investment under MOFERT.
In investment, the U.S. businesses came to agreement
with

China on

million.
biggest

252

projects

in

1988,

amounting to §325

Since 1979, the U.S. has always been one of the
investors

in China.

Sino-U.S.

joint ventures

include the much-watched Beijing Jeep, a joint venture with
Chrysler Co., Tianjin-Otis Elevators, Kentucky Fried Chicken,
Caterpillar, etc.

Such cooperative ventures have had mixed

results: the history of the Beijing-Jeep probably embodies
a lot of bitterness for both s i d e s , w h i l e joint ventures
like Tianjin-Otis Elevators and Kentucky Fried Chicken have
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had steady growth.

III. Trade With U.S.
The "Shanghai Communique" signed in 1972 between the U.S.
and Chinese government paved the way for U.S. reconciliation
with China.

The Nixon administration regarded normalization

of relations with China as a key strategic goal for the
stability

of

the

far east.

In January

1979,

the two

countries established a full diplomatic relationship.

This

turned a new page in trade between these two countries.
In 1979, the two governments reached their first Trade
Agreement, which granted mutual MFN (Most Favored Nation)
status for each other, facilitating bi-lateral trade between
the two countries —

such as allowing the Bank of China to

operate in the U.S. and the U.S. banks to operate in China,
and recognizing that China is a developing country in order
to clear the way for the possible granting of duty-free
imports through the Generalized System of Preference (GSP),
if China joins the IMF and GATT.
China

needs

U.S.

modernizations program.

as

a

trade

partner

in

its

four-

China especially is interested in

advanced U.S. technologies and capital equipment, and is also
a big buyer of U.S. agricultural products. China
lure U.S.

investment.

In return,

China

strives to

is becoming an

increasingly important supplier of textiles, toys, and light
industrial consumer products.
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1988 was a good year in the history of U.S.-China trade.
According to the Chinese statistics, total trade amounted to
$8,262 billion, a 22% increase'from a year before; China
exported $ 3.21 billion, and U.S. exported $ 5.052 billion.
U.S. statistics gives a different picture: total trade was
$14.3 billion; U.S. exported $5.3 billion, which is close to
the Chinese figure; and U.S. imported $9.3 b i l l i o n . T h e r e
is no explanation why the Chinese figure is so low. The
statistics from the Chinese customs sometimes is higher by
$20 billion than that of MOFERT, due to different accounting
methods.

The U.S.

figure should be more reliable here

because the Chinese has run a significant surplus in recent
years.

And the Chinese figure does show that.

In 1989,

total trade rose by 31% to a historic high of $17.8 billion.
U.S. exported $5.8 billion, and China exported $12 billion,
leaving a U.S. trade deficit of $6.2 b i l l i o n . T h e major
Chinese products sold in the U.S. were textiles, garments,
oil,

foodstuffs,

animal

porcelain, metals,

by-products,

arts

and chemical products.

and

crafts,

The major U.S.

products bought in China were crude oil equipment, chemical
equipment, aircraft, computers, steel, rubber and related
products, fertilizer, chemical materials, medical equipment,
paper, and so forth.

XV. June 4th: Turning Back
June 4th, 1989 was the day the Chinese students' pro-
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democracy movement was brutally suppressed.

This day marked

a turning back of modern Chinese history.

More than ten

years ' economic reform was put to an end that day by the very
man who initiated it.
After the suppression, economists and scholars were busy
calculating how many man days of work were lost from April
through June.^^

The figure came close to 10 to 15 billion.

These 15 billion man-days were really not that important when
compared to the real loss —

the changing of political and

economic direction and the loss of life's meaning for many
Chinese people.

The Wall Street Journal quoted one Chinese

as saying; "Once Chinese believed that building a socialist
society gave meaning to their lives.
they were born.

Now Chinese wonder why

We don't have the means to live life, nor

do we even have something to die for.

We merely consume

time.
The immediate impact of the pro-democracy movement on
international business was the halt of foreign investment
and loans.

Major international financial institutions, such

as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (the two world
leading

lenders

to

China's

ambitious

economic programs)

suspended their loans to China after the suppression.
caused great

financing problems

This

for many infrastructural

projects then under construction in China.

The World Bank

didn't resume its loans until eight months later.

Its first

loan to China was made in February, 1990, and was aimed at
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agricultural projects/’
In

November

suppression,
downgraded

1989,

debt
by

five

issued

Moody's

by

months
China

Investors

after
and

Service

the

Tiananmen

Hong

Kong

Inc.,

a

was

world

lending-rating agency. The business community's concern over
the dependence of Hong Kong's economy on the mainland's
political and economic weather immediately reflected this
downgrade in status.

Some observers say that the rating

itself will have little new impact on China's borrowing
because the increased risk had already been reflected in the
new recent loans to the mainland, but will make it more
difficult for China to tap the capital market.
The freeze on lending greatly affected foreign trade,
especially imports.

"The import pie will shrink", many

business people cried.

Import growth, as compared with the

year before, slowed to 16% in July and 7.1% in August, in
contrast with an average growth rate of 26% in the first
half.

The whole year's

import was

$38,127

billion,

a

decrease of 3.9% from the previous year.®’ It may take years
to see the negative impact of this decrease in import on the
growth

of

materials

export.
and

The

import

high-tech

of

urgently

equipment

needed

for

raw

China's

industrialization has slowed down, this in turn will slow
down the growth of industrial output which was expected to
represent a major part of export commodity in the years
ahead.

Because of this response-time lag, it is difficult
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to accurately and completely assess the damage now, but we
can be quite certain that damage has been done and will
gradually show itself.
Among things that will suffer most from the change of
direction are the reform programs begun under the now-purged
Communist Party chief, Zhao Ziyang.

According to a foreign

correspondent in Beijing, many of the programs "have been
scrapped indefinitely.

Aborted programs include decontrol

of prices, sales of state-owned enterprises and strengthening
the private sector —

all of which seemed likely to move

forward a year ago.

Instead,

the leaders are preaching

austerity, socialist orthodox and even recentralizing sectors
of the economy that had been well on the way to decontrol.
The reform program aimed at foreign trade system is one
of the economic sectors being severely affected.

Actually,

foreign trade corporations were the first group of units
targeted

for

suppression.

shake-up

and

reorganization

after

the

This was intended to purify the foreign trade

organizations in order to calm down the public indignation
for the party's corruption, as these organizations were known
for their nepotism —

their organizations are full of the

sons and daughters of high ranking Party officials.

The

Party's central committee hurried to make public a decision
that the family members of the central Party leaders are not
allowed

to

reflected

work
the

in

these

sensitivity

organizations.
and

This

really

of

these

importance
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organizations in Chinese society.
According to reports, the decision to recentralize major
segments of the Chinese economy came from a plenum of the
Communist Party's Central Committee in November 1989.

A

Chinese economist who had seen documentation of this plenum
remarked that a central theme prevails in the documents —
centralization,
Guangdong

politically

Province

for

and

economically.

example,

an

official

Taking
of

the

Commission of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of the
province

estimated

that

40%

of

the

1512

companies

in

Guangdong engaged in foreign trade would be closed or merged.
The companies that survived closure and merger would be
severely restricted in what they can trade.

"The crackdown

will return China to the system of the early 1980s, when a
few specialized state-owned trading companies handled the
nation's trade," the Wall Street Journal article commented.

V. Future Prospects
Suppression of the pro-democracy movement has created
severe aftershocks within Chinese society as a whole, not to
mention its economy and foreign trade.

The prospects of

China's foreign trade naturally have become of great concern
to the international business community.
Some analysts think China is in a recession, as there
was a sharp plunge in industrial output in January, 1990.
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Output fell

6.1%

from a year earlier to $27.1 billion,

according to China's State Statistical Bureau figures.

That

was the worst decline ever during the 11 years of reform.
A recession is defined as two consecutive quarters in which
a nation's economic output contracts.
provide

quarterly

figures,

some

While China doesn't

economists

believe that

China's GNP declined in the 1989 fourth quarter and perhaps
in the third quarter as well.
GNP grew 4%.

Yet overall in 1989, China's

The Chinese government attributed declines to

the four days' holidays of the traditional Chinese lunar year
—

the biggest holiday in China.
Other analysts pointed out that China could exhaust

foreign reserve sometime this year unless imports are cut
drastically to help narrow the balance of payment.

A country

is considered financially healthy if its reserves cover three
months of its imports and China's $14 billion reserve could
cover just that

if the previous import pace to continue.

But what indeed transpired was a drastic cut in imports.

In

January, 1990, imports declined by as much as 12.6% from that
of the last year, to $5.4 billion, while exports came to
$2.84 billion, an increase of 1% from that of the previous
year. 55
In overall foreign trade for 1989, the total import and
export value came to $81.5 billion.

Export was $43,128

billion, with an increase of 6.5% from a year before; import
was $38.27 billion, a decrease of 3.95% from a year before.
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These figures actually are surprisingly positive, taking into
consideration the effects of the Tiananmen repression: the
huge loss of man-days, the economic sanctions of the western
countries, and the freeze of loans.
There are several possible explanations for why China
managed

to

do

quite

well

economically chaotic year.

in

such

a

politically

and

First, growth rate was so great

in previous years that this year's chaotic situation merely
slowed it down.

The average growth rate of the last 11 years

in total foreign trade was 16.1%, while the growth rate of
1989

from that of 1988 was only 1.3%,

a sharp plunge

already, which was especially affected by the cut in imports.
Secondly, external trade is very much controlled by market
forces when the government does not constrain them.

The past

11 years of expansion had built up demand and supply of
Chinese trade in the world market.

The demand from within

can be controlled by the government at their will, but the
demands

from other countries

remain and are not easily

shifted elsewhere once business channels are established.
Besides, the Chinese government still tried hard to encourage
foreign trade because more trade could only contribute to a
better economy —

the basis for the political stability, the

latter being the foremost concern of the ruling Communist
Party.

This may

in one way

demonstrate that

sanctions do not work well economically.
well politically —

economic

They may work very

political pressure veiled as economic in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59

nature.
Thirdly, half a year is really too short a time to assess
the full economic impact.
delayed causation.

There could be a time lag, a

It may take several years or more for

these to manifest themselves.

Also, longer-term data will

be more reliable in substantiating any assessment.

From the above explanations and statistics we can see
that the prospects of China's foreign trade do not look as
bad as some observers have thought.

Though the political

suppression in June has indeed negatively influenced China's
economy

and

therefore

also

her

foreign

trade,

and the

economic recentralization and political tightening have also
set

back trade

reform programs,

officially the

Chinese

government still claims to maintain the economic reform and
the "open door" policy.

We have every reason to believe

these claims, as a reasonably good economy provides a stable
basis for their political rule.

Their problem is that their

political policies are not in harmony with their economic
policies.

Political expedience is often at the expense of

economy, and the economy cannot keep the pace of previous
growth.

Even during the period of reform, ".... occasional

recourse to the familiar rhetoric of self-sufficiency suggest
that the legacy of the Maoist era may influence the pattern
of activity for some time.

Yet the economy still grows,

even though at a slower pace.

The road of reform is full of
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twists, but the trend is forward and upward.
Secondly, the dynamic market forces give the advantage
to economic development.

While most businesses are waiting

to see what will happen in China,

some firms are again

becoming active in investment activities there.

The leading

U.S. firms are AT&T, Pepsi Cola, and MacDonald-Douglas and
Du Pont.

AT&T's new investment, in the name of its Dutch

subsidiary, is on optical fibre communication equipment in
Shanghai.

And at this time when most western firms are

hesitating,

investors from Taiwan are pouring into China

seeking investment opportunities.

The recent exposure of the

investment intent of Taiwan Plastic

one of the largest

conglomerates in the world, shocked all of Taiwan like the
detonation of an atom bomb.

Taiwan has the largest foreign

exchange reserve in the world, putting Japan in the second
place.

These new investments will certainly fill up some

vacancies left by western investors and thereby inject new
blood into the Chinese economy and provide new impetus to
foreign trade.

The law in Taiwan does not permit direct

investment in mainland China, so these investments are being
made

and

will

be

made

in

the

names

of

their

foreign

subsidiaries.
Thirdly,

the

austerity program.

Chinese

government

recently

eased

its

Some economists say that this new move

should breathe life into its sagging economy and give a boost
to many cash-strapped Sino-foreign joint ventures. Probably
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it will start a new boom-bust cycle.
Even under the austerity policy,

some of the joint

ventures were still successful. Tianjin-Otis Elevator is a
good example.

In the past five years, it has produced about

6 thousand elevators and the profit comes to 135 million
yuan, about 30 million in U.S. dollars.

It has 17% of the

domestic market share and has established 16 branches around
China.

Otis has reached a new five year agreement with its

Chinese partners to increase yearly production capacity from
1500 elevators to 3000.

This is a fine example of Sino-U.S.

joint ventures.^’ Another successful example is the Oregonbased Nike Inc.

After years of struggling with the Chinese

bureaucracy, its patience has paid off.

"Its five factories

in south China are now making 650,000 pairs a month, and Nike
hopes to export $100 million of shoes from China next year.
Moreover,

the China operation has just started turning a

profit."^®
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has explored many issues regarding the recent
reforms in China's foreign trade system.

After analyzing

these issues, the major problem seems quite clear: the oldmachine

bureaucratic

administration

and

structure
the

alienates

business

the

operation

personnel
of

these

organizations in such a way that they cannot function as an
organic whole.

An effective organization is one that has

blended its structure, management practices,

rewards, and

people into a package that in turn fits with its strategies.^’
The alienation of people from their organizations, and the
alienation of branch offices from head offices, makes it
impossible for this organization to achieve such a fit.
The reform launched in the beginning of 1988 was aimed
at eliminating this alienation and was a very bold step in
the right direction; had it continued, the effects upon these
organizations would be unprecedented in their history.

If

it had been successful, the organizational structure would
be in much better harmony with its task and mission, and each
operating unit would have much more vitality and efficiency
in their performances. Unfortunately, the suppression of the
pro-democracy movement in June of 1989 abruptly changed the
directions of politics and economics, and consequently made
effective reform impossible.
62
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Under the previous Chinese political situation, it took
strong leadership and great courage to attempt reform of the
strongholds

of

the

command

planning

connection,

the ousted Party chief

credits for the attempted reform.

system.

In this

Zhao Ziyang deserves

Singapore's Prime Minister

Lee Kuan Yew once remarked:"It took Zhao Ziyang 10 years to
build a team of economists who understood how the western
economy works and now that the team is part in exile, part
being rusticated and part missing."

Rebuilding that team,

Mr. Lee predicted, will take another ten years.

The Chinese constitute one fifth of the world population.
Whoever is in power in China in the future, the conservatives
or the reformers, will bear in mind that a sound and healthy
economy provides a stable basis for political power.
billion people need to eat,
prosper.

to live,

The one

to develop and to

The present regime must therefore stick with the

open-door policy,

at least in some aspects,

even though

politically they are regressing in most other respects.

But

the open-door policy embodies a funny sort of "Catch 22" for
the Chinese leadership:
minds;

the twelve years'

it has opened people's eyes and
reform has brought about rapid

economic growth and greatly raised people's living standards.
There is no way to efface the people's political awakening
or to bog down the economy.

Under current conditions,

China's economy will grow, even though at a much slower rate
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than it would under the original reform.
also grow.

China is still the largest untapped market per

capita in the world.
exists

Foreign trade will

apart

from

The big potential of this market

China's

political

situation.

It

therefore unwise to neglect or to abandon this market.

is
Of

course, it is inevitable that China's political situation
will affect the conscience of the people dealing with China
as

well

as

the

economic

exchanges

with

China.

adjustments should be made in strategy, not in policy.
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A p p e n d i x A:

SELECTED FIGURES ON CHINA'S EXTERNAL TRADE
(1950-1989)
(In $ 000,000,000)

Year

Export

Import

Total

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

5.52
7.57
8.23
10.22
11.46
14.12
16.45
15.97
19.81
22.61
18.56
14.91
14 .90
16.49
19.16
22.28
23.66
21.35
21.03
22.04
22.60
26.36
34.43
58.19
69.49
72.64
68.55
75.90
97.45
136.58
182.72
208.93
218.19
221.97
244.16
259.15
270.14
347.11
406.40
432.80

5.83
11.98
11.18
13.46
12.87
17.33
15.63
15.06
18.90
21.20
19.53
14.45
11.73
12. 66
15.47
20.17
22.48
20. 20
19.45
18.25
23.26
22.05
28.58
51.57
76.19
74.87
65.78
72.14
108.93
156.75
195.50
194.82
174.78
185.30
253.56
343.31
330.83
333.99
398.50
382.70

11.35
19.55
19.41
23.68
24.33
31.45
32.08
31.03
38.71
43.81
38.09
29.36
26.63
29.15
34.63
42.45
46.14
41.55
40.48
40.29
45.86
48.41
63.01
109.76
145.68
147.51
134.33
148.04
206.38
293.33
378.22
403.75
392.97
407,27
497.72
602.46
600.97
681.10
804.90
815.00

Source: China's Foreign Trade Year Book— - 1989
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Appendix B :

SELECTED U.S. EXPORTS TO CHINA,

1988

(U.S. $ 000,000)
•
Value

Share
Growth
of Total(%) over
1987(%)

5,032.9

100

44

Grain

698.9

14

199

Plastics, resins

595.9

12

134

Wood Products

447.1

9

167

Fertilizers

378.7

8

40

Aircraft

341.1

7

-32

Specialized machinery

334.0

7

42

Organic chemicals

256.7

5

71

Scientific equipment

200.1

4

20

ADP equipment

200.1

4

6

General Industrial
machinery

171.6

3

-3

Total U.S. Exports
Of which:

Source: U.S. Commerce Department.
Exports calculated freight on board (f.o.b.)
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A p p e n d i x Cr

SELECTED U.S.

IMPORTS FROM CHINA,

1988

(U.S. $ 000,000)
Value

Share
Growth
of Total(%) Over
1987(%)

9,269.8

100

34

Clothing

2,212.6

24

1

Toys, sporting goods

1,838.4

20

42

Yarn, fabrics

608.0

7

9

Telecommunications
equipment

528.6

6

112

Petroleum

496.7

5

-6

Household electrical
appliances

465.6

5

198

Travel goods, handbags

461.9

5

45

Shellfish, seafood

331.1

4

131

Metal manufactures

266.0

3

66

Total U.S. Imports
Of which:

Source: U.S. Commerce Department.
Imports calculated free along-side ship (f.a.s.)
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Append!y D :

Major Foreign Trade Corporations Under The
Ministry Of Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade

China National
China National
Corp.
China National
China National
China National
China National
China National
China National
China National
China National
China National
China National
China National
China National
China National
China National
China Economic

Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs I/E Corp.
Native Produce and Animal By-Products I/E
Textiles I/E Corp.
Light Industrial Products I/E Corp.
Arts & Crafts I/E Corp.
Chemicals I/E Corp.
Metals & Minerals I/E Corp.
Machinery I/E Corp.
Instruments I/E Corp.
Technical I/E Corp.
Medicines & Health Products I/E Corp.
Silk I/E Corp.
Embroidery & Drawnwork Associated I/E Corp.
Packaging I/E Corp.
Foreign Trade Transportation Corp.
Complete Plant Export Corp.
and Trade Consultants Corp.

Source: Directory Of Chinese Foreign Economic Relations And
Trade Enterprises (Beijing: China Foreign Economic
Relations And Trade Publishing House, 1987)
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Appendiy Tü:

China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China
China

Selected Foreign Trade Corporations Under
The Line Ministries.

National Agricultural Machinery I/E Corp.
National Seed Corp.
Rural and Town Enterprises I/E Company.
Textile Machinery and Technology I/E Corp.
International Water & Electric Corp.
National Offshore Oil Corp.
Petro-Chemical International Company.
National New Building Materials I/E Corp.
National Nonferrous Metals I/E Corp.
National Machinery & Equipment I/E Corp.
National Electric Wire & Cable Export Corp.
North Industries Corp.
Great Wall Industry Corp.
Nuclear Energy Industry Corp.
National Aero-Technology I/E Corp.
National Automotive Industry I/E Corp.

Source: Directory Of Chinese Foreign Economic Relations And
Trade Enterprises (Beijing: China Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade Publishing House, 1987)
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